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Possible Turn't Military and a second	
Possible Iraqi Military Action Against Syria  Talking Points for the DDCI	
19 September 1983	
Summary	
We see no possibility that Iraq could be induced to attack S	Svria to force
a reopening of the Iraqi oil pipeline. Iraq lacks the military o	anahility to
credibly threaten Syria. The entire Iraqi Army is tied down alon front and most vital Syrian targets are near the limits of the ra	nnac of Irani
fighter aircraft. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, already vulner domestic criticism over the war with Iran, will not risk a two fr	ahla ta
moreover, even it the Israelis were able to tie down Syria's force	es. Saddam
would not risk attacking Syria and appearing in the eyes of the A a tool of the Israelis. The Iraqis almost certainly realize that	any attack
on Syria, rather than forcing Syria to reopen the pipeline. likel	V would
provoke Damascus into destroying it. Finally, we doubt Iraq woul scheme in which Iraq's vulnerability to Syrian retaliation is lin	ked to
Israel's attacking Syrian forces along the Golan. Iraq would exp sucker them into attacking Syria, then do nothing themselves.	ect Israel to
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Iraqi Military Capabilities	
Ground Forces	
Iraq has an army of 600,000 troops, nearly three times	that of
Syria. The Iraqis and Syrians are nearly equal in armo artillery.	r and
·	
All of Iraqi's 20 divisions, however, are stationed alo Iranian front. Only a few Iraqi police and border guar	ng the
stationed along the Syrian border.	a units are
As a result, any move by the ground forces against Syri	a would have
to come at the expense of the Iranian front, something the Iraqis would not do. Baghdad would reason that, the	wa haliawa
that, that,	e moment it
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launched an attack agains against the Iraqi forces	st Syria, Iran would still on the Irania	d launch an offensive an border.	
Even if Baghdad was will most we estimate it could approximately 30,000 trod significantly threaten th	d spare would be abo ops. This would be	out two divisions	
Iraq would be aware that have an effect, thus rais in a two front war. In the Syrian border and made over Lebanon. The Syrian	sing the possibility 1976 Iraq deployed s de threatening state	y of becoming bogged down some 75,000 troops along ements to the Syrians	
Moreover, Iraqi ground for of the pipeline nor Syria force Damascus to reopen Euphrates, as an example for Iraqi ground forces. are some minor oil fields towns.	an installations of the pipeline. The is some 250 kilome The most the Iraqi	sufficient value to major Syrian dam on the eters from Iraq, too far is could hope to seize	
Because the Iraqis could pipeline, Damascus would stations on the pipeline	retain the option of	of destroying pumping	25X1 25X1
Air Force			
Iraq has some 400 operate eight times as many opera	ional fighter and bo ational aircraft as	omber aircraft, about Iran.	
We estimate Iraq could sp for attacks against Syria Air Force to defeat Iran they could spare much les	The Iraqis, who ian ground attacks,	depend heavily on their	
Even if the Iraqis used a significantly outnumbered Syrian fighter aircraft.	200 aircraft against I by the approximate	t Syria, they would be ely 500 operational	
Moreover, most important the country, near the lin heavily defended by Syria	lits of the ranges o	of the Iragi aircraft and	25X1
Israeli Involvement			
war. Such a situation wo	orces. Unless Israe   would risk being l ould be disastrous f ready vulnerable to	el actually goes to war left alone in a two front	

Yet, once there is a crisis involving Israel and Syria, the Iraqis almost certainly will not attack Syria for fear of being perceived by the other Arabs as an Israeli accomplice.					raqis eived

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